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A B S T R A C T
Despite the lack of robust empirical evidence, a growing number of media reports attempt to link climate change
to the ongoing violent conflicts in Syria and other parts of the world, as well as to the migration crisis in Europe.
Exploiting bilateral data on asylum seeking applications for 157 countries over the period 2006–2015, we assess
the determinants of refugee flows using a gravity model which accounts for endogenous selection in order to
examine the causal link between climate, conflict and forced migration. Our results indicate that climatic
conditions, by affecting drought severity and the likelihood of armed conflict, played a significant role as an
explanatory factor for asylum seeking in the period 2011–2015. The effect of climate on conflict occurrence is
particularly relevant for countries in Western Asia in the period 2010–2012 during when many countries were
undergoing political transformation. This finding suggests that the impact of climate on conflict and asylum
seeking flows is limited to specific time period and contexts.
1. Introduction
The ongoing Syrian conflict, which began in March 2011, has drawn
attention from both the scientific community and the media to the
question of how climatic conditions can contribute to political unrest
and civil war. Recent studies of the Syrian uprising have shown that
growing water scarcity and frequent droughts, coupled with poor water
management, led to multiyear crop failures, economic deterioration
and consequently mass migration of rural families to urban areas
(Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015). Rapid growing population, over-
crowding, unemployment and increased inequality put pressure on
urban centers and finally contributed to the breakout of political unrest.
Should these mechanisms be in place, the effect of anthropogenic cli-
mate change on the frequency and intensity of extreme events is ex-
pected to affect the risk of violent conflicts by aggravating such drivers
of conflicts as poverty, food insecurity and inequalities (IPCC, 2014).
Conflicts bring about a series of negative consequences including
premature death, disability, psychological trauma, physical injury and
malnutrition (Murray et al., 2002). Likewise, conflict can also be the
cause of displacement. There is evidence that violence, in particular,
serves as a main push factor in the case of forced migration (Moore and
Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997). If climate change does induce con-
flict, then indirectly climate change also contributes to forced migra-
tion. Indeed, recent media headlines, especially those on Europe’s re-
fugee crisis, often cite climate change-induced conflict in the Middle
East and Africa as a major driver of the surge of migrants to Europe in
the past couple of years. The narrative behind these headlines tends to
follow a similar path, claiming climate change reduces availability and
alters the distribution of resources such as water, food and arable land,
which in turn trigger violent conflict and, as a consequence, migration.
However, scientific literature linking climate, conflict and migration
together is relatively scarce. The existing literature on the impacts of
climate change on conflict and migration commonly assesses how en-
vironmental pressures instigate outmigration and consequently how
climate change-induced migration promotes conflict in migrant re-
ceiving areas. The arrival of climate migrants can put pressure on in-
frastructure, services and the economy of the receiving area, leading to
competition over resources, especially when the resources are scarce
(Reuveny, 2007). However, whilst this narrative is common amongst
scholars of peace and conflict studies (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Reuveny,
2008, 2007), there is little empirical evidence supporting this claim
(Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007). Generally,
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drivers of migration such as climate, political factors, economic con-
ditions and conflict are considered simultaneously in empirical speci-
fications, without considering the pathway through which migration is
determined. Typically, in macro-level studies at the country or regional
level, migration flows are estimated using linear models, which control
for relevant socioeconomic and political confounding variables. The
specific impact of climate on migration is then isolated, often using
multivariate models (Piguet, 2010). Beine and Parsons (2015), for in-
stance, include international violence along with climate-related vari-
ables in their model and find that the increase in the incidence of in-
ternational violence corresponds with higher migration flows. Likewise,
using the occurrence of a civil war as a proxy for institutional quality,
Drabo and Mbaye (2015) report a similar finding, although their result
applies only to highly educated individuals. Whilst these models show a
closed-form impact of conflict on migration they do not provide in-
ference on any causal links between climatic or environmental factors
and conflict and hence do not address the indirect pathway through
which climate affects migration through conflict, that is often high-
lighted in the media.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no scientific study that has
empirically established the links between climate change, conflict and
migration and identifies the causal pattern in a convincing manner,
partly due to the inherent complexity of the task (Fröhlich, 2016). As of
now, both the empirical support and theoretical foundations of such
relationship are scarce (Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016). A recent article by
Missirian and Schlenker (2017) addresses the relationship between
asylum seeking and temperature fluctuations using asylum applications
to the European Union between 2000 to 2014 as a proxy of conflict.
Climate-induced conflict is thus not measured directly but through the
assumption that asylum applications reflect distress-driven migration.
Apart from employing a very limited approach and exclusively using
temperature as a single climatic indicator, the study does not explicitly
examine the causal link between climate and conflict. The lack of sci-
entific rigour of the interpretations of the results offered has caused
justifiable criticism by fellow scholars (see for example the discussion in
http://wmbriggs.com/post/23581). Another recent study by Owain
and Maslin (2018) explores how droughts and temperature variability
are related to population displacement and conflict in East Africa. By
including both conflict and displacement in the same empirical model,
the study tests the relationships between climatic factors and conflict;
and climatic factors and migration. In this research design, it is not
possible to explicitly disentangle the pathways through which climate
influences migration.
This paper aims to empirically establish the causal path from cli-
mate change to violent conflict and cross-border migration and explore
how climate and conflict interplay in influencing asylum seekers flows.
Exploiting bilateral refugee flows data for the years 2006–2015 for 157
countries, we employ sample selection methods for gravity-type models
to first estimate the impact of climate on conflict and, secondly, how
conflict influences forced migration. To the best of our knowledge, the
causal link between climate, conflict and migration is investigated for
the first time at this level of statistical rigour. Our study unpacks con-
flict as a causal mediator between climate change on the one hand and
asylum migration on the other. This study thus provides an empirical
assessment of scientific evidence on the popular claim regarding the
role of climate change on conflict and migration. Our results suggest
that climatic conditions, by affecting drought severity and the like-
lihood of armed conflict, play a statistically significant role as an ex-
planatory factor for asylum seeking exclusively for countries that were
affected by the Arab Spring.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a review of empirical literature on climate, conflict and migration
and discusses the underlying mechanisms through which climate can
influence migration. Section 3 describes estimation methods and data.
Section 4 presents the main results and additional results from ro-
bustness checks. Section 5 discusses the main findings and concludes.
2. Review of the literature on conflict, climate and migration
As mentioned in the introduction, there is no study that empirically
assesses the existing causal relationships between climate, conflict and
migration simultaneously. Empirical studies on the subject tend to be
organized along the triplet axes of climate change and migration; cli-
mate change and conflict; and conflict and migration. With respect to
the first strand of literature, there is no empirical consensus on the
relationship and the direction of association between climate change
and migration – climatic shocks may induce, constrain or have no im-
pact on migration depending on the particular characteristics of the
climatic shock and the region of occurrence. Cross-national studies
based on household surveys and micro-censuses report mixed evidence:
whilst an increase in temperature is associated with higher interna-
tional migration in Uganda, outmigration tends to decrease with a
temperature rise in Burkina Faso and Kenya, and no relationship is
found between migration and temperature anomalies in Nigeria and
Senegal (Gray and Wise, 2016; Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava, 2016).
Even studies that focus on a particular country usually do not find an
identical pattern. Rainfall deficits suppress US-bound migration from
rural Mexico according to some studies (Hunter et al., 2013; Nawrotzki
et al., 2015) but increase migration according to others (Barrios Puente
et al., 2016). Likewise, macro level studies of bilateral migration be-
tween countries also report inconsistent findings with international
migration increasing with higher temperature on the one hand
(Backhaus et al., 2015; Cai et al., 2016; Cattaneo and Peri, 2016) and no
relationship being found in other pieces (Beine and Parsons, 2015).
Inconsistency in the existing empirical findings is largely due to
heterogeneity in measurement, methods and data used (Beine and
Jeusette, 2018). Climate variables include both slow onset and fast
onset events. The former captures long-run climatic factors typically
measured as levels, deviations, anomalies or variability of precipitation
and temperature. Fast onset climatic factors generally capture natural
disaster events including temperature and precipitation extremes,
floods, storms and droughts. Definitions of what is considered to be
deviations from normality and extreme events, for instance, vary across
studies. Likewise, migration encompasses different types of mobility
including internal and international migration, forced and voluntary
migration and is sometimes indirectly measured, for instance, the rate
of urbanisation is used as a proxy for internal migration (Barrios et al.,
2006). The choices of climate and migration definitions and measures
can thus influence the direction and magnitude with which climate
affects migration.
Furthermore, the lack of consensus reflected by these findings is
partly due to the inherent complexity of migration processes. Climatic
impacts on migration might be indirectly mediated through social,
demographic, economic, political and environmental factors (Black
et al., 2011; Hugo, 2011). The most widely used conceptual framework
in the study of environmental migration is that of Black et al. (2011),
which states that in addition to exercising a direct influence, environ-
mental change induces changes in other drivers of migration and thus
indirectly affects migration decisions. Indeed, some macro-level studies
provide support of the indirect effect of climatic factors on international
migration which run through reduction of crop yields (Cai et al., 2016),
changes in GDP per capita (Cattaneo and Peri, 2016; Coniglio and
Pesce, 2015) and wage differentials between origin and destination
(Beine and Parsons, 2015). Even considering only the indirect channel,
the effect of climatic factors on the mediators is not homogenous.
Cattaneo and Peri (2016), for instance, report increased migration with
higher temperature for middle-income countries, whilst migration is
suppressed in low-income countries.
Climate change can potentially influence the drivers of migration
through different climatic hazards such as a rise in sea level, change in
the frequency and intensity of tropical storms and cyclones, changes in
rainfall patterns, increases in temperature and changes in atmospheric
chemistry (Black et al., 2011). These changes directly affect the
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environmental drivers of migration such as water availability and crop
and pasture productivity, as well as provoking a loss of ecosystem
services. Climate change also indirectly influences other drivers of
migration. For instance, economic drivers are affected through the re-
duction of household incomes due to a decline in crop, livestock or
fisheries productivity. Similarly, climate change exacerbates problems
related to the availability of limited resources and violence emerges
over access to these resources (Raleigh, 2010). Indeed, a systematic
review of 53 studies on environmental change and migration focusing
on Africa by Borderon et al. (2018) reports that there is no evidence
showing that environmental change is the sole driver of migration.
Considering complex interactions between migration drivers is thus
essential when examining the link between climate and migration.
As for the second strand of literature on the relationship between
climate and conflict, the evidence from large-scale studies appears
fairly robust. By analysing 41 African countries during the period
1981–99, Miguel et al. (2004) suggest that rainfall variation affects the
probability of the onset of conflicts through its effects on GDP per ca-
pita. Thus, short-term drops in the opportunity costs (i.e. from forgone
earnings because of drought periods) of being a rebel (or government)
soldier significantly increases the incidence of civil conflict. A recent
meta-analysis of 60 quantitative studies confirms that the risk of con-
flict increases substantially with deviations from normal precipitation
and mild temperatures (Hsiang et al., 2013). On average, one standard
deviation change toward warmer temperatures or more extreme rainfall
increases the frequency of interpersonal violence by 4% and intergroup
conflict by 14%. Another meta-analysis of 55 studies reports a similar
finding whilst emphasising that climate is unlikely to be the sole or
even the primary driver of human conflict (Burke et al., 2015). Similar
to how climate may affect migration, changes in climate also influence
conflict through multiple pathways ranging from agriculture and eco-
nomic productivity or demographic pressure to psychological me-
chanisms. However, quantitative research examining the key causal
pathways is still in its infancy and more evidence is called for.
The challenges involved in disentangling the direct causal effects of
climate variability on conflict occurrence have led to diverse empirical
results linking these two phenomena depending upon research designs,
variables used, case studies and scales of analysis (Ide, 2017;
O’Loughlin et al., 2014). Special issues of the Journal of Peace Research
and Political Geography (see Gleditsch, 2012; Nordås and Gleditsch,
2007) for instance, collect pieces of research on how climate affects
conflict occurrence and present mixed evidence on this relationship.
Raleigh and Urdal (2007) report a quantitatively small effect of en-
vironmental variables on the risk of conflict and highlight the role that
freshwater scarcity plays in this relationship, and the results in
Bernauer et al. (2012) lead the authors to recommend against the
generalization of the link between environmental change and violent
conflict. Buhaug et al. (2014) challenge the robustness of the results in
Hsiang et al. (2013) by noting that they could be seriously affected by
sample selection, since it would be difficult to consider the countries for
which results are available (and thus are included in the meta-analysis
by Hsiang et al., 2013) as randomly chosen. The issue of sample se-
lectivity in studies assessing the climate-conflict link has also been re-
cently addressed by Adams et al. (2018), who conclude that the fact
that this literature has concentrated on few cases may have led to biases
in the empirical results reported. In addition, the climate-conflict link
may be affected by other variables that interact with environmental
pressures, such as ethnical fractionalization (Schleussner et al., 2016),
and may depend on the level of geographical granularity at which the
phenomenon is assessed (O’Loughlin et al., 2012).
Although there is not much statistical evidence of the link between
climate and conflict in Syria, the Syrian uprising provides a case study
on how climate change and drought play a role in triggering conflict.
During the period 2007–2010, Syria experienced the worst drought
likely to be caused by anthropogenic climate change (Kelley et al.,
2015). The three-year severe drought resulted in a dramatic reduction
of the supply of groundwater. Severe droughts coupled with inadequate
water management decisions, poor planning and policy errors led to
large-scale multiyear crop failures. Dramatically rising food prices
coupled with economic deterioration led to displacement and migration
of rural farming families to urban areas (Gleick, 2014). The rapid in-
crease in urban population from 8.9 million in 2002 to 13.8 million in
2010 put pressure on infrastructure, economic resources and social
services in the urban areas which were key areas being neglected by the
Assad government. The devastating consequences of drought due to
poor governance and unsustainable agriculture and environmental
policies consequently contributed to political unrest in Syria (Kelley
et al., 2015). This narrative describes a pathway trough which climate
change triggers conflict by its interactions with other socioeconomic
factors. However, the work of Selby et al. (2017) casts doubts on this
narrative, arguing that the evidence linking climate change to conflict
in Syria is unreliable and that the scale of the migration caused by the
drought was small.
If climate nevertheless does influence conflict, the next question is
how conflict is linked with migration. The evidence from the third
strand of literature on conflict and migration suggests that countries
that experience different types of violent conflict tend to have higher
outmigration and refugee flows (Beine and Parsons, 2015; Drabo and
Mbaye, 2015; Gröschl and Steinwachs, 2016; Hatton and Williamson,
2003). However, not all conflicts result in migration: push factors play a
role in determining outmigration flows whilst the area of destination is
determined by pull factors attracting migrants to a specific region. Si-
milar to the relationship between climate and migration, it is unlikely
that conflict alone is a major driver of mobility and displacement but
traditional push and pull factors such as differences in per capita in-
come between origin and destination, population size and distance also
influence outmigration considerably (Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2009;
Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010). However, when conflict involves violence
as measured by e.g. the ratio of victims of massacres, migration out-
flows increase with violence at the origin and migration inflows de-
creases as violence intensifies at the destination (Lozano-Gracia et al.,
2010).
Likewise, it is also plausible that the influence of conflict on out-
migration is indirect. Conflict affects many factors that may in turn
induce migration, such as income loss, the breakdown of social rela-
tions and institutional failure. Some studies, for instance, do not find a
direct effect of armed conflicts on migration but an indirect one
working through the reduction in GDP per capita in origin countries
(Coniglio and Pesce, 2015).
Note that the relationship between conflict and migration can be a
reverse one. Literature in peace and conflict studies, in particular, often
perceives conflict as an outcome of environmental migration (Raleigh,
2010; Reuveny, 2008, 2007). Environmental degradation and resource
scarcity are assumed to lead to population movements in response to
environmental pressure. The increase in the number of migrants can
contribute to conflict in migrant receiving areas in many different ways.
This ranges from competition over natural and economic resources,
ethnic tensions, socioeconomic tensions and burden on infrastructure
and services. Reuveny (2007) emphasises that in the context of neo-
Malthusian resource scarcity, climate change-induced migration is
particularly prone to creating conflict in the destination area because
large and rapid migration flows prevent the receiving areas to smoothly
incorporate migrants. There is however not much empirical support for
this theoretical model, especially because the evidence on climate-in-
duced mass migration is weak (Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016; Fröhlich,
2016) and there are many other factors (e.g. political stability, eco-
nomic conditions and capacity of government to provide services) that
appear empirically more relevant than migration (Burrows and Kinney,
2016). The lack of evidence is supported by a recent study by Cattaneo
and Bosetti (2017). The study finds no significant relationship between
the presence of international climate migrants and conflict in destina-
tion countries. Therefore, a reverse causation of climate-induced
G.J. Abel et al. Global Environmental Change 54 (2019) 239–249
241
migration leading to conflict is unlikely in our case.
Based on the empirical literature on the relationships between cli-
mate and conflict, as well as between conflict and migration, the impact
of climate change on migration can be thought of as being mediated
through conflict in the structure presented in Fig. 1. The relationship
between climate change, conflict and migration is likely to follow the
sequence of climate change exacerbating human conflict due to com-
petition over scarce resources. For instance, recurrent severe droughts
due to climate change can lead to conflict and instability in a country
with poor management of natural resources. Consequently, climate-
induced conflict outbreak drives displacement and outmigration. Fig. 1
also presents a possibility of the reverse causation depicted by grey
arrows whereby climate change first drives outmigration and subse-
quently migrant pressure contributes to conflict.
To model the causality structure of the relationship between cli-
mate, conflict and migration, the analysis should be done in two steps,
by first looking at how climate influences conflict and secondly how
conflict drives migration. Nevertheless, generally, drivers of migration
(e.g. climate, political factors, economic conditions and conflict) are
assessed simultaneously in the literature without considering the causal
structure through which migration is determined. To this end, this
study aims at empirically establishing the causal path from climate
change to violent conflict and to cross-border migration, and to explore
how climate and conflict interplay in influencing cross-border migra-
tion. Exploiting bilateral asylum seeking flow data for the years
2006–2015 for 157 countries, we employ a gravity-type model with
endogenous selection to estimate the impact of climate on conflict and
secondly to assess how conflict influences forced migration. This study
thus provides an empirical assessment of the popular claim regarding
the role of climate change on conflict and migration.
3. Modelling global asylum-seeking flows and data
3.1. Model specification and estimation methods
Our modelling framework aims at assessing quantitatively the de-
terminants of asylum seeking flows using a gravity equation setting
similar to that proposed for bilateral migration data (Cohen et al.,
2008) but addressing explicitly the statistical problems of endogenous
selection in origin-destination pairs and non-random treatments. In this
sense, our statistical problem is similar to those often encountered in
health care studies, where for example the enrollment in a healthcare
maintenance organisation (treatment) affects a person’s decision on
both whether to use healthcare at all (extensive margin) and how much
to spend for healthcare (intensive margin), given a positive decision.
In our setting, however, conflict (treatment) itself is not randomly
‘assigned’ across the population of origin countries, that is, we have to
consider the treatment itself to be endogenous as well. As with the
healthcare example given above, this treatment (conflict) potentially
affects the probability that we observe non-zero flows between some
origin-destination country pairs (extensive margin). In other words, we
have to account for a selection of countries in sending out migrants to a
certain country of destination. Furthermore, conflict potentially affects
the number of migrants seeking asylum in some destination countries.
The number of migrants, however, is only observed in the case of actual
flows and thus has to be considered as being potentially (non-ran-
domly) censored.
This setting leaves us with three simultaneous equations, where two
of them contain our common endogenous binary regressors (i.e. conflict
onset). In order to estimate this framework of simultaneous equations,
we apply a simple two-step estimation technique proposed by Kim
(2006). Translated to our context, we are interested in the following
sample selection model:
= + = >c Z c I c, ( 0)i c i c i i i* , 1 , * (1)
= + + = >s Z c s I s, ( 0),ij s ij i s ij ij ij* , 2 2 , * (2)
= + + =a Z c a a s, ,ij a ij i a ij ij ij i* , 3 3 , * (3)
where Eq. (1) specifies the occurrence of conflict ( =c 1i ) in country i,
Eq. (2) addresses whether a non-zero flow of asylum seeking applica-
tions takes place from country i to country j ( =s 1ij ) and Eq. (3) models
the size of the flow of applications in logs (aij) from origin country i to
destination country j for origin-destination pairs with non-trivial flows.
I x( ) is an indicator function taking value one if x is true and zero
otherwise and the exogenous controls for each one of the equations in
the model are summarized in the vectors Zc i, , Zs ij, and Za ij, , respectively.
The error terms, ,c i, s ij, and a ij, , are assumed jointly multivariate
normal and potentially correlated, thus capturing the endogenous se-
lection of origin countries that present non-zero asylum applications to
destination countries. Following Kim (2006), this sample selection
model with a common endogenous regressor in the selection equation
and the censored outcome equation is estimated as a hybrid of the bi-
variate probit and the type-II Tobit model containing the common en-
dogenous binary conflict indicator. This implies that we have to control
for the endogeneity caused by ci and the selection bias caused by the
censoring indicator sij at the same time.
Instead of a simulation assisted Full Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
Fig. 1. Conceptual model of climate, conflict and migration.
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approach, we follow Kim (2006) and employ a simple two-step esti-
mation technique by first estimating the bivariate probit model with
structural shift (Eqs. (1) and (2)) and further use the estimation results
of this first stage as control functions for the censored outcome equation
using a simple Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. This
way we can interpret the model as a Type V-Tobit model with bivariate
selection and parameter restrictions. This approach bears the advantage
of being numerically robust and easy to implement since it relaxes the
strong normality assumptions imposed when using the FIML approach.
For the empirical identification, we impose exclusion restrictions,
that is, for each regression we include regression-specific covariates
that identify treatment and selection, respectively. These regression-
specific covariates affect the main dependent variable (i.e. number of
asylum applicants) only through the instrumental variable (endogenous
treatment or selection identifier in our case) and not directly. This
statistical approach allows us to directly discuss potential climate re-
lated effects on conflict and thus - through the imposed statistical
structure - on asylum seeker flows.
3.2. Data and measurement
3.2.1. Asylum-seeking flows data and patterns
Bilateral data on asylum applications are sourced from the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) (UNHCR,
2018). The data are provided to UNHCR by a mixture of sources. In
more developed countries, host governments are generally the sole data
provider, whilst in developing countries UNHCR field offices and other
NGOs play a more important role in data collection.
Asylum seekers are defined as individuals who have sought inter-
national protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet
been determined. The UNHCR data contains information about asylum
applications by year and the progress of asylum-seekers through the
refugee status determination process starting in the year 2000. We focus
on asylum seeking applications for two reasons. First, asylum seeking
can be linked to conflict more directly than regular migration which is
driven by various other push and pull factors. Second, whilst refugee
flows are also likely to be driven by conflict, they are endogenous to a
host country’s specific policy in granting a refugee status. We therefore
use asylum application data since actual stock and refugee figures are
prone to be strongly affected by country-specific political actions.
Fig. 2 shows chord diagram plots depicting cumulative bilateral
links for asylum seekers in the periods 2006–2010 and 2011–2015
based on bilateral data from the UNHCR. In the first period considered,
the largest source of asylum seekers was from Sub-Saharan Africa, with
many of them making applications within the region. Additionally,
Western Europe received a large volume of asylum applications, espe-
cially from Northern Africa and Western Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and
Southern Asia. In the period 2011–2015, the number of asylum appli-
cations in Sub-Saharan Africa remained large (about 1.8 million asylum
seekers). However, the origin regions of the largest number of asylum
seekers in this period were Northern Africa and Western Asia (over 2.4
million), predominantly in Syria and other countries affected by the
Arab spring. Many of those seeking asylum from these countries made
applications in countries of Southern Europe and Western Europe.
3.2.2. Conflict data
Information on battle-related deaths are from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global ver-
sion 17.1 (UCDP, 2018). The dataset contains 135,181 events and the
dataset covers the entirety of the globe (excluding Syria), with in-
formation ranging from January 1989 to December 2016. The figures
for Syria are obtained from the UCDP Battle Related Deaths Dataset
17.1, which contains conflict-year and dyad-year information on the
number of battle-related deaths in conflicts from 1989 to 2016. The
most recent version is version 17.1. Conflict is defined by the existence
of at least one yearly battle-related death, although robustness checks
are carried out using a threshold of 25 casualties.
3.2.3. Climate data
Climatic factors are measured using the Standardised Precipitation-
Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI). The SPEI is a multiscalar drought
index based on climatic data and used for determining the onset,
duration and magnitude of drought conditions with respect to normal
conditions in a variety of natural and managed systems (e.g. crops,
ecosystems, rivers). SPEI data are obtained from the Global SPEI da-
tabase, which offers historical information about drought conditions at
the global scale, with a spatial resolution of 0.5° and monthly peri-
odicity (Beguería et al., 2010). The current version of the dataset covers
the period between January 1901 and December 2015 based on Cli-
matic Research Unit’s TS 3.23 input data (monthly precipitation and
potential evapotranspiration (Harris et al., 2014).
SPEI measures the intensity and spatial distribution of droughts. It is
Fig. 2. Asylum seeking flows by world region, 2006–2010 and 2011–2015.
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considered superior to other drought indices, since it captures the ef-
fects of evaporation and transpiration caused by temperature, along
with precipitation (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010). SPEI is measured on
an intensity scale with negative values, indicating drought conditions,
and positive values, indicating wet conditions. The index can be used to
further categorise drought conditions into mild (-1< SPEI < 0),
moderate (-1.5 < SPEI ≤ -1), severe (-2< SPEI ≤ -1.5), and extreme
(SPEI ≤ -2) (Mckee et al., 1993; Paulo and Pereira, 2006).
3.2.4. Socioeconomic and geographic data
The information on the remaining covariates employed in our
model is obtained from a variety of sources. Additional variables in Eqs.
(1) and (2) include variables which are a standard battery of controls
previously used in the literature when considering determinants of
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003;
Miguel et al., 2004). Variables such as ethnic polarization measures,
economic performance approximated by log-transformed GDP per ca-
pita before the observational period and the level of democratization
are included to control for potential confounders of conflict.
For the estimation of asylum-seeking flows, we include standard
control variables: distance between country of origin and country of
destination, whether countries share a common language, a dummy
variable measuring whether the countries have a colonial relation,
population size at the country of origin and destination and migrant
networks. The choice of covariates is based on the previous literature
that employs gravity models to estimate bilateral migration flows in the
context of climate change (Backhaus et al., 2015; Beine and Parsons,
2015). This set of control variables captures bilateral and country-
specific push and pull factors different from conflict in the country of
origin.
The data for the variables in the gravity model that builds the third
stage of our empirical specification is partly sourced from Mayer and
Zignago (2012), with data on the distance between countries based on
capital cities. The results of our analysis are qualitatively unchanged
when most populated areas or country centroids are used instead of
capital cities. The measurement of a country's political status is mea-
sured using the Polity IV index (Marshall et al., 2017), normalized
between 0 (autocracy) and 1 (democracy). Our ethnic polarization
measurement is obtained from the Geographical Research On War,
Unified Platform (Bormann et al., 2015). When data are missing, the
CIA Factbook is used as a source of information. For the calculation of
the ethnic polarization index, we apply the Garcia-Montalvo (Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol, 2005) and compute
=4 (1 )i
N
i i
1
2
Here, i is just the proportion of people that belong to the ethnic (re-
ligious) group i and N is the number of groups. We also estimated our
model using conventional fractionalization indices, given by
=1 iN i1 2, yielding no qualitative changes to the results of our ana-lysis. Socioeconomic indicators such as GDP per capita and population
figures are sourced from Feenstra et al. (2015) and missing information
in this dataset is interpolated making use of the International Monetary
Fund's WEO Database (IMF, 2018).
4. Results
4.1. Main results
Tables 1 and 2 present the parameter estimates of Eqs. (1)–(3),
obtained using the method described in Kim (2006) for cross-sectional
data corresponding to different 5-year subperiods (2006–2010,
2011–2015), as well as three-year periods (2007–2009, 2010–2012 and
2013–2015). The parameter estimates for the equations modelling
conflict and selection to asylum seeking are presented in Table 1. These
results indicate that armed conflict tends to be persistent, with coun-
tries that have experienced a large number of battle-related deaths prior
to the period under study having a higher probability of conflict.
Countries with levels of medium democracy, on the other hand, tend to
present a higher probability of conflict when compared to their fully
democratic or autocratic counterparts. Differences in the severity of
drought episodes (related to lower values of the SPEI) are able to sig-
nificantly explain differences in the onset of conflict in the period be-
tween 2011 and 2015, but not for 2006–2010. The predictive power of
the variable is mostly driven by its ability to explain conflicts occurring
in the interval 2010–2012 and thus appear related to the emergence of
armed conflict in the context of the Arab spring and the Syrian war, in
addition to war episodes in Sub-Saharan Africa. As can be inferred from
the significant positive parameter estimate of the conflict dummy in the
asylum seeking selection equation, countries that experience war tend
to be systematically more prone to present non-zero asylum seeking
applications to the rest of the world. Countries with a history of asylum
seeking linkages (be it as an origin or a destination) tend to have a
higher probability of sending or receiving asylum seeking applications,
and this probability is also higher for nations which are geographically
close to each other.
The marginal effects of the SPEI variable on conflict and selection to
asylum seeking for the 2010–2012 period are presented in Fig. 2 for all
countries in our dataset. It should be noticed that the nonlinearity
embodied in the link between climate, conflict occurrence and refugee
flows implies that the quantitative effect of changes in drought prob-
abilities on asylum seeking depends on the rest of the variables of the
model. The model therefore allows for global and regional economic
conditions to affect the probability of a given climatic shock creating
asylum seeking flows and predicts different effects by country. Ag-
gregating marginal effects by world region, our results indicate that the
effect of changes in the SPEI index appears particularly large in Sub-
Saharan African countries, some Central and South American nations,
as well as in Asia. The combined average marginal effect for the SPEI
variable in the period 2010–2012 implies that a one (within-country)
standard deviation decrease in the SPEI leads on average to an increase
of approximately 0.03 in the probability of asylum seeking flows from
the country experiencing this change in climatic conditions. Such a link
between changes in drought severity and asylum seeking flows is
mediated by the increase in conflict probability caused by the change in
the climatic variable, which can be very large in some world regions, as
shown in the first panel of Fig. 3.
The parameter estimates for Eq. (3), which have a direct specifica-
tion as (semi-)elasticities, are presented in Table 2. A higher number of
asylum seeking flows are found in destination countries which share the
same language as the origin country. Asylum seeking applications tend
to take place from countries with relatively low indicators of democracy
to countries where civil liberties and political rights are well developed.
Depending on the subsample on which the estimation is carried out, the
point estimates in Table 2 imply that existence of conflict in the origin
country increases the flow of asylum seeking applications to a given
destination by 95 to 146 percent.
Based on the experience of the current decade, our results lend
support to the existence of a mechanism whose causality runs in a first
stage from climate to conflict and in a second stage from conflict to
sending out asylum seekers and subsequently the size of asylum seeking
flows. This causal linkage, however, is mostly related to the experience
of conflicts in the years 2010–2012, a sub-period that was dominated by
the birth of military conflicts in Libya, Egypt, Syria and South Sudan.
4.2. Robustness checks
The main results suggest that the influence of climate on conflict
occurrence and subsequent asylum seeking flows applies to a specific
geographical context and time period. In order to understand how the
experience of particular world regions in the period studied and the
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definition of conflict affect our results, we perform a robustness check
using different model specifications. In particular, for the period where
we find a significant effect of climate on asylum seeking flows
(2010–2012), we change the definition of conflict by using a threshold
of 25 battle-related deaths and reestimate our main model excluding
the regions of Western Asia and Northern Africa. These were the parts
of the world affected by the Arab Spring in the period under study.
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the conflict and se-
lection to asylum seeking equations (Eqs. (1) and (2)) for the period
2010–2012. We also perform a similar robustness check for the third
equation, estimating asylum seeking flow size. The results for the es-
timates of this equation are robust and is provided in the Supplemen-
tary Material.
Changing the definition of our conflict variable and the sample of
countries employed in the estimation substantially modifies the results
of the conflict and selection equations and thus provides valuable in-
formation about the nature of the effect of climate on asylum seeking.
In particular, the redefinition of the conflict variable, as well as the
exclusion of countries in the Western Asian and Northern African region
(both individually and as a single region, named Arab Spring region in
Table 3), renders the effect of the climate variable insignificant in the
period under consideration. These results imply that the effect of SPEI
on conflict occurrence is specific to relatively small conflicts (as defined
by battle deaths) and to countries which were affected by the Arab
Spring in the period 2010–2012.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Existing frameworks for the study of migration drivers tend to de-
fine five categories of factors affecting migration flows (see Lee, 1966)
and the embedding of this framework in climate change research by
(Black et al., 2011): economic drivers (differences in income and em-
ployment opportunities that act as determinants of migration flows),
political drivers (with conflict being one of its most important materi-
alizations), demographic drivers (related to the size and composition of
populations in origin regions, as well as health-related factors), social
drivers (that include cultural practices) and environmental drivers
(linked to ecosystem services). Our study concentrates on how en-
vironmental and political drivers interact with each other as determi-
nants of forced migration as measured by asylum seeking applications.
Our analysis assesses quantitatively the climate-conflict-migration as-
sociation at a global level using an econometric model that aims at
Table 1
Parameter estimates: Conflict and selection to asylum seeking equations.
2006–2010 2011–2015 2007–2009 2010–2012 2013–2015
Conflict
αT −1.92*** −1.66* −1.26· −1.79* −0.87
(0.58) (0.75) (0.65) (0.75) (0.63)
Battle Deathst-1 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.49***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.12)
SPEI Index12t-1 −0.72 −1.01· −0.19 −1.24* −1.45·
(0.57) (0.52) (0.55) (0.51) (0.86)
Democratizationot-1 3.41 3.68 2.02 6.78* 1.23
(2.68) (3.03) (2.26) (2.83) (2.66)
(Democratizationot-1)2 −3.22 −3.60 −2.25 −6.63** −1.55
(2.42) (2.86) (2.05) (2.53) (2.48)
Diasporaot-1 −3.09 −3.15 −9.75** −2.78 −3.00
(2.77) (3.55) (3.76) (2.55) (2.77)
Ethnic Polarizationot-1 0.53 −0.15 1.01 −0.54 −0.37
(0.62) (0.75) (0.72) (0.57) (0.57)
Selection
αS −3.01*** −3.25*** −3.75*** −3.43*** −4.21***
(0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.22)
Distance −0.26*** −0.24*** −0.27*** −0.24*** −0.19***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Distance2 −0.03 −0.05* −0.04* −0.05* −0.07**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Total Outmigrationot-1 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.23***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Total Immigrationdt-1 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.31***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Endogenous Treatment
Conflict 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.45*** 0.53*** 0.49***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11)
Control Terms
ρ120 −0.29* −0.39*** −0.29* −0.33*** −0.41*
(0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.18)
ρ121 −0.19* −0.15 −0.15* −0.30* −0.16*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07)
Log Likelihood −18496.99 −17229.64 −15956.40 −17182.41 −15176.29
AIC 37,023.98 34,489.28 31,942.80 34,394.82 30,382.58
BIC 37,145.48 34,610.78 32,064.30 34,516.32 30,504.07
Number of observations (all) 24,336 24,336 24,336 24,336 24,336
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05, ·p < 0.1.
Standard errors clustered at country of origin and country of destination.
Natives in destination measured as log-transformed stock of the respective origin natives in the destination country.
Distance is measured as geodesic distance between origin and destination countries.
Colonial Relation indicates, whether there has ever been a colonial relationship between origin and destination (‘Mother Country’).
Democracy measures the democratic or autocratic tendency of a countries political rule from 0 (autocratic) to 1 (democratic).
GDP measures the Gross domestic production of country i measured in logs.
μij are the respective auxiliary parameters used in the GMM second stage estimation. (See Kim (2006)).
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identifying these links explicitly. In addition, the choice of an econo-
metric framework that explicitly assesses sample selection allows us to
interpret our results in a causal manner. In particular, the methodology
developed by Kim (2006), which we apply in our analysis, explicitly
assesses the biases that may be implied by the lack of random selection
in the outbreak of conflict and in the existence of non-zero asylum
applications. By overcoming the problem of endogenous selection, this
method allows us to identify our estimates as measuring the actual
causal link going from climate to conflict and asylum seeking. In con-
trast to the analysis carried out by Missirian and Schlenker (2017), our
results indicate that there is no empirical evidence backing the ex-
istence of a robust link between climatic shocks, conflict and asylum
seeking for the full period 2006–2015. The estimates of our model
support these causal linkages only for the period 2010–2012, where
global refugee flow dynamics were dominated by asylum seekers ori-
ginating from Syria and countries affected by the Arab spring, as well as
flows related to war episodes in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Excluding these regions from the analysis provides further statistical
evidence, that the link between climate shocks, conflict and subsequent
migration flows might rather be interpreted as a local phenomenon and
therefore very specific to these regions. Indeed, our study shows that an
increase in drought episodes can drive outmigration through exacer-
bating conflict in a country with some level of democracy. This is
confirmed by the finding that climate contributes to conflict only in a
specific period of 2010–2012 and specifically to certain countries,
particularly those in Western Asia and Norther Africa experiencing the
Arab Spring. Climate change thus will not generate asylum seeking
everywhere but likely in a country undergoing political transformation
where conflict represents a form of population discontent towards in-
efficient response of the government to climate impacts.
In line with Miguel et al. (2004), the results of our study imply that
policies to improve the adaptive capacity to deal with the effects of
climate change in developing economies may have additional returns
by reducing the likelihood of conflict and thus forced migration out-
flows. From a policy point of views, our empirical analysis provides
empirical backing to some of the arguments put forward, among others,
by Barnett (2003), who argues for conceptualizing global responses to
climate change also in the framework of national security
Table 2
Parameter estimates: Asylum seeking flow size.
2006–2010 2011–2015 2007–2009 2010–2012 2013–2015
Exogenous Variables
α 1.41* 0.53 3.69*** 1.28* 1.40
(0.61) (0.64) (0.64) (0.62) (0.85)
Natives in Destinationt-1 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18
(0.53) (0.50) (0.60) (0.55) (0.62)
Distance 0.32· 0.30· 0.29 0.30· 0.32·
(0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Distance2 −0.09 −0.12 −0.04 −0.09 −0.12
(0.36) (0.33) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35)
Common Language 0.60*** 0.34*** 0.49*** 0.39*** 0.16·
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Colonial Relation 0.02 0.26· 0.16 0.22 0.13
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Democratizationot-1 −0.97*** −1.18*** −0.65*** −0.94*** −0.99***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Populationot-1 −0.08 −0.09 −0.10 −0.07 −0.03
(1.73) (1.64) (1.80) (1.72) (1.81)
GDPdt-1 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.06
(1.02) (0.97) (1.07) (1.02) (1.09)
Democratizationdt-1 0.36* 0.91*** 0.41** 0.69*** 0.37*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18)
Populationdt-1 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.13
(1.75) (1.65) (1.82) (1.74) (1.82)
Treatment
Conflict 1.27*** 1.46*** 0.95*** 1.30*** 1.30***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
Control Terms
μ11 −0.24** −0.17* −0.45*** −0.33*** −0.11
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
μ12 −2.33*** −2.34*** −2.38*** −2.14*** −2.37***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
μ01 −0.53*** −0.59*** −0.01 −0.42*** −0.65**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.20)
μ02 −1.72*** −1.68*** −1.94*** −1.62*** −1.62***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
AIC 63,798.19 67,187.72 57,747.92 61,042.74 63,773.28
BIC 63,927.78 67,317.31 57,877.52 61,172.33 63,902.88
Number of observations (all) 24,336 24,336 24,336 24,336 24,336
Number of observations (truncated) 6140 6363 5271 5769 4745
Number of observations (treated) 6240 5928 7020 6708 6864
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05, ·p < 0.1.
Standard errors clustered at country of origin and country of destination.
Natives in destination measured as log-transformed stock of the respective origin natives in the destination country.
Distance is measured as geodesic distance between origin and destination countries.
Colonial Relation indicates, whether there has ever been a colonial relationship between origin and destination (‘Mother Country’).
Democracy measures the democratic or autocratic tendency of a countries political rule from 0 (autocratic) to 1 (democratic).
GDP measures the Gross domestic production of country i measured in logs.
μij are the respective auxiliary parameters used in the GMM second stage estimation. (See Kim (2006)).
Specification uses I(Battle deaths> 0) as treatment on the full distribution of origin-destination pairs.
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considerations and human security concerns. The integration of con-
cerns related to conflict-driven forced migration in the current policy
discourse concerning actions to combat climate change appears parti-
cularly urgent in the context of the targets defined by the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). The link between climate change and
migration is not made explicit in the SDGs, which focus on adaptation
measures and do not treat forced migration and climate change as in-
terrelated phenomena which may be moderated by conflict onset. The
results presented provide empirical backing to the connection of these
two policy goals in the design of climate change responses at the global
Fig. 3. Marginal effects of SPEI on conflict and selection to asylum seeking for the 2010–2012 period.
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level, a proposal recently voiced also by Stapleton et al. (2017).
Gaining a deeper understanding of the characteristics of migration
flows which are driven by climate shocks is a potentially promising
path of further research. The availability of data for refugee populations
(see Buber-Ennser et al., 2016, for example) should enable future em-
pirical studies which will shed light on the particular mechanisms
through which climate change acts as a push factor through its role as a
catalyst of conflict. While our analysis concentrates on asylum seeking
flows due to data availability at the global level, case studies that would
be able to quantify forced migration flows in a more detailed manner
would also be important in order to advance our knowledge on the
causalities underlying the climate-conflict-migration trinity.
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